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A note
This paper is in honor of our (M.Stat(QE)-1980-81 batch) 
teacher of “Cost-Benefit Analysis” at ISI-Kolkata.
Introduction, motivation and discussion
As a teacher of microeconomics at a business school, one is periodically 
confronted with news items such as this: https://www.citylab.com/transporta-
tion/2016/09/uber-consumer-surplus/500135/.
If you read this article then you will see it makes non-trivial use of consumer 
surplus (= willingness to pay  – what one pays) as a measure of consumer wel-
fare. I would be honestly delighted if someone could produce a similar article 
addressed to business professionals and/or economists using equivalent variation 
(EV) and/or compensating variation (CV). Consumer surplus is a measure of wel-
fare, whereas CV and EV are measures of change in welfare. Naturally, there are 
many statements using consumer surplus that cannot be phrased using CV and EV. 
As we all know, willingness to pay is conventionally measured by the area under 
the demand curve. Section 7.5 of Katzner (1970) contains a detailed discussion 
on consumer surplus. Consumer surplus along with the other welfare concepts 
mentioned above are defined and discussed in chapter 12 of Mandy (2017). 
This leads to a certain amount of discomfort about the relationship between 
undergraduate microeconomics (or managerial economics) and graduate micro-
economics. In reality, what is applied, and particularly for policy purposes, is under-
graduate microeconomics or its managerial version, and not the microeconomics 
that is taught in graduate programs in economics. However, if there is a gap or 
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inconsistency on a topic between the two, then one invariably tries to pass off the 
undergraduate level explanation as a simplification/approximation of the ‘gospel 
truth’ that is apparently conveyed in graduate level microeconomics. Thus, for 
instance, undergrad demand theory is passed off as utility maximization subject 
to budget constraint assuming utility functions are quasi-linear. Quasi-linear utility 
means utility of money held along with non-monetary consumption goods is equal 
to money held, plus utility derived from consumption goods. Assuming budget 
constrained quasi-linear utility functions renders undergraduate microeconom-
ics horrendously inadequate, since then we cannot talk about normal, inferior 
or luxury goods. We cannot say that if income goes up then the demand curve 
will shift upwards (or downwards). Income change has no effect on the demand 
curve. There would be very little meaning left in undergraduate microeconomics. 
Even so, such an inadequate answer sounds credible, since the entire approach 
towards undergraduate microeconomics is based on ‘hand waving’. There is no 
stand-alone rigorous approach to undergraduate microeconomics. Undergraduate 
students are told that if they pursue graduate economics then they will be told 
what real microeconomics is all about. And, what are they told if and when they 
enroll for graduate economics? They are told that the utility functions may be 
Cobb-Douglas  – a favorite of Applied General Equilibrium Theory. Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions say that for every commodity there is a fixed fraction, so that 
regardless of what prices are a consumer’s expenditure on the good is that fixed 
fraction of his disposable income. Hence if when your income is US$ 50,000 per 
month, the price of rice is US$ 1 per kilogram, and you are buying 5 kilograms 
per month, then for the same income, if for some reason price of rice shot up to 
US$ 4 per kilogram, you would be buying 1.25 kilograms for the entire month. Is 
such a form of microeconomics the best that is possible? I feel we can do better if 
we try to make the foundations of undergraduate microeconomics more rigorous 
and require a certain minimum amount of consistency between graduate level 
microeconomics and the microeconomic theory taught at the undergraduate level. 
We share in an appendix of this paper a teaching note about an important 
issue in undergraduate and MBA level microeconomics, written for those who 
are interested in the logical foundations of what they are taught or what they are 
teaching. We are all for improvement, generalization and more rigor in the math-
ematics that is involved in the exposition. We leave that as a significant mission 
for further research. However, the economic theory reported in the appendix is 
not negotiable, since that is precisely what the paper is about. 
In undergraduate consumer demand theory as well as in managerial econom-
ics, we teach that the consumer surplus is the area under the inverse demand curve 
up to the quantity consumed minus the expenditures. Implicitly what we mean 
is that the area under the inverse demand curve measures the Willingness To Pay 
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(WTP), so that when expenditure on the good is subtracted from WTP we have 
Consumer’s Surplus (CS). But when is the area under the demand curve the WTP? 
The first major result in this teaching note says that willingness to pay is the area 
under the demand curve if and only if consumers are surplus maximizers. The 
‘mathematical jungle’ which this and the ancillary results give rise to is purely 
because we show that this result holds not only for an individual consumer in 
a market, but also when we aggregate across commodities or individuals or both, 
so that it holds for the macroeconomic AS-AD (Aggregate Supply-Aggregate De-
mand) model as well. Yet why should that be a matter of any importance? The 
reason for its importance is that the inverse demand function depends not only 
on the quantity of the good that is consumed, but also on the prices of other 
goods and income. Hence, in general, WTP depends not only on the quantity of 
the good that is consumed, but prices of other goods and income. Furthermore, 
WTP cannot be the utility from the non-monetary goods consumed and con-
sumer’s surplus is not (any kind of) utility minus expenditure. If we assume that 
WTP does not depend on income then we can of course assume that WTP is the 
monetary worth of consuming non-monetary goods, i.e. the consumer is a budget 
constrained quasi-linear utility maximizer. This as we observed earlier trivializes 
consumer demand theory, contrary to the requirements of economic policy. 
There is a common misconception that willingness to pay is a measure of satis-
faction and further that it is interpersonally comparable as a measure of satisfaction. 
An example of this confusion or misunderstanding is available at the following the 
link: https://worldpolicy.org/2016/01/29/consumer-surplus-and-related-absurdities/ 
While willingness to pay may well qualify to be a monetary measure of the 
benefits that accrues to an individual or a group, it is certainly not a measure of 
satisfaction, particularly when it comes to interpersonal comparisons of satisfac-
tion. Hence, the fact that Bill Gates may be willing to pay more for a slice of pizza 
than a poor and hungry person does not conflict with the equally convincing con-
jecture that Bill Gates gets less satisfaction from the slice of pizza than the latter 
does. It only means that Bill Gates, being a rich person, can and is willing to pay 
a huge amount of money and considerably more for a wee bit of satisfaction than 
what the poor man is willing to pay for a huge amount of satisfaction, provided 
satisfaction is numerically measurable. It does not conflict with the assumption 
of diminishing marginal utility of money, even in the extreme situation (such as 
the one assumed by the author of the article posted at the above link) where 
everyone has the same utility function for money. The same argument is true for 
an individual. On a hot summer day in the desert regions of western India, if 
a thirsty person is willing to pay more for the first pouch of cold potable water 
(sold in polythene bags) more than the second pouch, it does not mean nor is 
it required that the individual is indifferent between the consumption bundle 
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consisting of one pouch of water and his income reduced by the price of a pouch 
of water and the consumption bundle consisting of two pouches of water and his 
income reduced by the expenses for two pouches of water. He could prefer the 
former consumption bundle to the latter consumption bundle or the other way 
round. Which consumption bundle the individual prefers between the two would 
depend on what the price of a pouch of potable water is. It may be reasonable to 
assume that more benefit (measured in monetary units) is usually preferred to 
less of it ceteris paribus by an individual or group of individuals. That, however, 
does not justify heroic conclusions about its relationship with more or less satis-
faction. Cost benefit analysis, whether for an individual or a society, is a decision 
making procedure based on accounting and is thus concerned with economic 
welfare from a purely accounting perspective. Reckless cognitive or psychologi-
cal interpretations of such and related concepts are totally unwarranted. Further, 
since we are not concerned with any psychological interpretation of willingness 
to pay, the kind of representation of surplus maximization by using a quasi-linear 
utility function, that several generations of economists have been exposed to from 
their undergraduate days, and is hopefully represented for the last time in chap-
ters 3 and 4 of (Hayashi 2017), is not relevant for our analysis. The unfortunate 
misunderstanding of consumer surplus as a ceteris paribus concept (consequent 
to willingness to pay being defined that way in this paper) and the controversy 
surrounding it, is reflected in the discussions in pages 268–269 and the conclud-
ing section of chapter 12 of (Mandy 2017). 
In Katzner (2008) it has been observed that if the individual consumer is 
a utility maximizer and if P’ and P” are two price vectors, then the difference in 
the utility of the baskets of commodities that he/she demands at P’ and P” is the 
sum, appropriately adjusted, of the areas under the relevant individual demand 
curves. That is, the sum of all the consumer surpluses (again appropriately ad-
justed) is a measure of the consumer’s CHANGE in welfare as prices P’ change 
to P” or visa versa. (Thus neither equivalent variation nor compensating varia-
tion is necessary to deal with welfare changes.) Under additional assumptions, 
this proposition is generalized to many consumers on p. 510. No assumption of 
surplus maximization is required. It is probably worth mentioning that similar 
results are available in (Takayama 1982, 1984) and a very transparent proof of 
Takayama’s main result is available in (Raa 2017). Both Raa and Katzner show 
that for budget constrained homothetic preference maximization implies that 
the change in indirect utility resulting from a change in prices, when the indirect 
utility function is generated by a utility function which is the logarithm of any 
linear homogeneous representation of the preferences (and is thus supposed to 
represent the preferences as well) is equal to the change in consumer’s surplus. 
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Having admitted that the results mentioned in the above paragraph are indeed 
significant, it is worth noting that: 
(i)  The work horse of most applicable microeconomics are inverse demand func-
tions which are linear in the own price of the commodity, and it is doubtful 
if such inverse demand functions can be generated by budget constrained 
homothetic preference maximization (how long should we keep economic 
theory locked up in its ivory tower?). 
(ii)  At a very general level, utility functions are defined on the non-negative orthant 
of the commodity space and not merely on the strictly positive orthant of it 
and this would conflict with the logarithmic representation as desired by the 
authors of the possibility result for most homothetic preferences.
(iii)  We are concerned with measuring consumer surplus and not just changes 
in consumer surplus. There is no guarantee that the consumer’s surplus can 
be defined for demand functions generated by arbitrary budget constrained 
preference maximization when the preferences are homothetic.
(iv)  Apart from the fact that many would be very uncomfortable with invoking 
the concept of willingness to pay for a bundle of goods without referring to 
any price or income, there seems to be no compelling reason to interpret 
a certain numerical representation of preferences as a monetary measure of 
welfare, simply because calculations go through smoothly and provide ap-
parent consistency between two unrelated concepts. The results are quite 
accidental, even if they are very likely the product of extra-ordinary minds at 
work, in much the same way that a clock that does not work always shows 
the correct time twice a day. 
In undergraduate and MBA microeconomics courses, what we are really 
concerned with when we discuss and apply the concept of surplus on the buy-
ers’ side of the market is the surplus of a group of consumers rather than that 
of an individual consumer. Hence, if what we are concerned with is the aggre-
gate demand function of a group of consumers, then the hypothesis of surplus 
maximization is reasonably safe and beyond obvious dispute, since from the 
stand-point of microeconomic theory the alternative approach of representing 
aggregate demand function as that of a budget constrained preference maximizing 
representative consumer is an entertaining research project whose implications 
do not influence the classical demand theory of a budget constrained preference 
maximizing individual consumer at all. On the other hand, if we assume that con-
sumers as individuals are budget constrained preference maximizers while at the 
same time measuring an individual consumer’s welfare by his consumer surplus, 
then for the sake of a complete theory of consumer demand, we need to show 
that budget constrained preference maximization implies surplus maximization.
54
Somdeb Lahiri
As is well known in consumer demand theory (see for instance Proposi-
tion 3.C.1 in (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995) preferences are ‘continuous’ 
on the non-negative orthant of a finite dimensional Euclidean if and only if they 
are representable by a continuous utility function. The last result in the appendix 
proves that for a ‘very large class of utility functions’, budget constrained utility 
maximization implies surplus maximization and hence everything else that it 
implies. This is a fairly robust result since it holds for a general class of demand 
functions including many which are routinely applied in applied microeconomics. 
Hence, our theory does not contradict the Walrasian budget constrained utility 
maximizing model. In fact, it could be considered to be a generalization of the 
latter model. Consumer surplus maximization makes sense even for consumers 
who are not rational. The undergrad micro model of consumer demand is a gen-
eralization of the grad level model.
Since, as we have shown before, surplus maximization is equivalent to the 
willingness to pay being equal to the area under the inverse demand curve up to 
the amount consumed, consumer surplus – the traditional measure of consumer 
welfare – makes sense, even for a consumer who is not ‘rational’ in the sense of 
classical consumer demand theory. The scope of consumer surplus maximization 
is wider than the scope of rational consumer choice theory and the former could 
be considered to be a generalization of the latter. For the required background 
on budget constrained preference maximization, nothing beyond chapter 3 of 
(Katzner 1970) (and not even all of it) is really required. It is worth noting that 
to obtain our last result we use the concept of marginal rate of substitution as 
being equivalent to marginal willingness to pay, which is available in chapter 7 of 
(Hayashi 2015). The reason why our proof sails through is that, unlike (Hayashi 
2015), we do not invoke a quasi-linear utility for the purposes of a surplus maxi-
mization exercise. 
The reason why we feel that our main results are important is because the 
Hicksian measures of changes in aggregate welfare, such as aggregate EV and ag-
gregate CV, are based on the unobservable private information of consumers, i.e. 
their preferences over consumption bundles which comprise the non-negative 
orthant of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Even assuming that consum-
ers do not face any conflict of interest while stating their preferences, it is one 
thing to ask a decision maker to rank a finite set of alternatives according to his 
preferences along a criteria or even provide numerical evaluations of a finite set 
of alternatives according to some criteria (as in the literature on individual and 
social/group decision theory in the tradition of Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen) 
and an entirely different matter to ask a decision maker to reveal his preferences 
accurately over alternatives represented by points in the non-negative orthant of 
a finite dimensional Euclidean space as in Walrasian consumer demand theory, 
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which we are presently concerned with. The problem in the latter case is that of 
an individual’s inability to articulate his preference rather than the inclination 
to distort it. It is precisely this problem of acquiring relevant private information 
from individuals that is not required for the functioning of a free (to the extent 
that is practical) market economy, one formed the basis of Friedrich Hayek’s ar-
guments against central planning in his famous debate with Oscar Lange. Unfor-
tunately Milton Friedman hijacked the debate in his well known book where he 
referred to a free market economy as capitalism and justified it for what it often 
fails to deliver, i.e. freedom, rather than its real merit, which is usually a work-
able and practical resource allocation mechanism. The other method by which 
preferences can be recovered, at least on the range of the demand function, is 
by appealing to the Hurwicz–Uzawa Integrability theorem and then solving a sys-
tem of partial differential equations, to recover a utility function that represents 
consumer preferences. This, as correctly observed and rigorously established in 
(Border 2003) is easier said than done. In addition, this would require information 
about individual demand functions, whereas what are estimated from empirical 
observations are market demand functions. Market demand functions not only 
depend on aggregate income but also on the distribution of income and thus 
viewing it as the demand function of an aggregate/representative consumer may 
not be meaningful. Hence, the question of applying the Hurwicz–Uzawa Integra-
bilty theorem to the market demand, may not even be possible from a conceptual 
point of view. On the other hand, aggregate consumers’ surplus can be calculated 
directly from aggregate demand functions, regardless of whether individual de-
mand functions are those of budget constrained preference maximizers or not. 
I find it difficult to imagine how compensations based on Hicksian measures of 
changes in welfare can be implemented in reality, without resorting to significant 
computational complexity, provided such a computation is even feasible. Inciden-
tally we can define the equivalents of EV and CV in terms of consumer surplus: 
(a) How much income should be taken away from the consumers at new prices 
to restore the same surplus to them as before? (b) How much income should be 
given to the consumers at the old prices to provide them with the same consumer 
surplus that they get at the new prices? How the answer to these two questions 
may relate to the difference in the two consumers’ surpluses is not apparent to 
the author as yet.
It should be clear to economic theorists that the scope of our discussion, 
which encompasses all demand functions that satisfy the (uncompensated) law 
of demand and the choke price property, is considerably larger than the set of 
demand functions generated by budget constrained utility maximization and 
satisfies these two properties. The law of demand is well accepted, including by 
those who have a nodding acquaintance with economics. The choke price property 
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may require mild additional assumptions in order to be theoretically validated. 
However, this is no stranger to applied economists. Most research in industrial 
organization is content with linear demand functions which automatically satisfy 
the choke price property. At the same time, we should not be under the impres-
sion that the choke price property is automatic. It is tempting to conclude that 
smooth (in the sense of C  over the set of consumption vectors with strictly positive 
coordinates), strictly increasing and strictly concave utility functions, will neces-
sarily intersect all axes. The reason is that in cases with a little more regularity, 
which in particular requires that the intersections are not tangential, the choke 
price property is satisfied for all commodities at all price vector-income pairs. 
(It is worth noting that the Cobb-Douglas utility functions, although smooth, do 
not increase strictly; nor do Leontief utility functions which represent the perfect 
complementarity of the preferences). We now provide an example of a smooth 
strictly concave and strictly increasing utility function with indifference curves 
not intersecting the axes.
Consider an economy with a single non-monetary consumption good, only 
non-negative quantities of which are consumed by an agent, and these quantities 
are represented by Q and M respectively.
Let U: 2 be the utility function U(Q,M) = 2  e Q  – e M for all Q  0, M  0. 
It is easily verified using standard elementary calculus that U is a smooth strictly 
concave and strictly increasing utility function. Further u(0,0) = 0 and u(Q,M)  2 
for all Q, M  0. Consider the point (Q1, M1) such that Q M1 1 14= = − ( )log . Clearly, 






2, ) = − − = . 
Towards a contradiction there exists M  0 such that U( M0 3
2
, ) = . Then 
e M− = − <1
2
0 , leading to a contradiction, since the exponential of no real number 
can be negative. Hence the indifference curve through (Q1, M1) does not intersect 
the axis along which the consumption of the non-monetary good is measured.
Similarly, it can be shown that this indifference curve does not intersect the 
axis along which the consumption of money is measured.
In fact, a necessary and sufficient condition for an indifference curve of this 
utility function to intersect the axes is the value of the utility function along the 
indifference curve is less than 1. An example of such an indifference curve is the 
one passing through − ( ) − ( )( )log , log34 34 .
It should be emphasized that this paper is concerned with the logical founda-
tions of consumer demand theory as taught in a course in microeconomics at the 
undergraduate level or MBA programs in business schools. Hence, the targeted audi-
ence of this paper (apart from some exceptions) comprises teachers of the subject 
at the appropriate level. The text above informs the reader about the model/context 
and results we are concerned with, all of which is a comprehensive teaching note, 
relegated to an appendix of the paper. Thus, the potential instructor may use the 
above text to motivate himself/herself and at the same time inform his/her students 
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as to what the topic concerns i.e. the rehabilitation of consumer’s surplus as an 
exact measure of welfare from the stand-point of cost benefit analysis. Thereafter, 
the appendix can be referred to for a formal presentation. 
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Appendix
Consider an economy comprising of L  1 commodities and money and 
H  1 consumers.
Let p  L denote a price vector the ith co-ordinate of which denotes the 
price of ith good and let I H  denote the vector of incomes of the H consumers.
A demand function D associates to each price vector income vector pair (p,I) 
the vector D(p,I) L, where for i {1,..., L}: D i(p,I) is the maximum amount of 
commodity i that the consumers want to buy at (p,I). If H = 1, then the demand 
function is that of a single consumer.
Given a commodity i, let p-i
L 1 be a price vector denoting prices of all com-
modities other than commodity ‘i’.
We assume that for all commodities i and pairs (p -i, I)
L 1 H , there exists 
a price of commodity i, pi(p -i, I) > 0 called the choke price of commodity i at 
(p -i, I), such that for all pi  pi(p -i, I), Di(pi,p-i), I) = 0 and for all 0 < pi < pi(p -i, I), 
Di((pi,p-i), I) > 0.
Here (pi,p-i) is the price vector such that pi is the price of commodity i, and 
all other prices are as given in p-i.
For all (p -i, I)
L 1 H , let Qi(p -i, I) {+ } such that {Di((pi,p-i), I)|pi > 0} 
= [0, Qi(p -i, I)). 
We also assume that for all commodities i and pairs (p -i, I)
L 1 H there 
exists a continuous function qi(.|(p -i, I)):[0, Qi(p -i, I))   called the inverse 
demand function of commodity i, such that: 
(i)  for all Qi [0,Qi(p -i, I)), Di(qi(Qi|(p -i, I)),p -i), I)) = Qi;
(ii) for all (p -i, I)
L 1 H and Qi, Q i [0, Qi(p -i, I)): [Qi > Q i]  
implies [qi(Q i|(p -i, I)) > qi(Qi|(p -i, I))].
Property (ii) requires that the demand or inverse demand function for each 
commodity satisfies the (uncompensated) Law of Demand.
For each (p -i, I)
L 1 H  and Qi [0, Qi(p -i, I)), let Wi(Qi|(p -i, I)) denote the 
maximum that the consumers as an aggregate are willing to pay for Qi units 
of commodity i at (p -i, I).
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The consumers as an aggregate are said to be competitive surplus maxi-
mizers in market i, if for all (p -i, I)
L 1 H  and Qi [0, Qi(p -i, I)), Wi(Qi|(p -i, I))  – 
+ Qiqi(Qi|(p -i, I))  Wi(ξ|(p -i, I))  – ξqi(Qi|(p -i, I)) for all ξ [0, Qi(p -i, I)). 
An equivalent definition of competitive maximizers is the following. 
The consumers as an aggregate are said to be competitive surplus maximiz-
ers in market i, if for all (p , I) L   H  and Qi [0,Qi(p -i, I)), Wi(Di(p,I)|(p -i, I))  – 
+ piQi  Wi(Qi|(p -i, I))  – piQi. 
Proposition 1: Given the assumptions above the consumers as an aggregate 
are competitive surplus maximizers in market i, if and only if for all (p -i, I) 
L 1 





q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .
Proof: Suppose the consumers as an aggregate are competitive surplus 
maximizers in market i.
From the definition of the inverse demand function it follows that for ξ ≤ Qi, 
if p x= ( )( )−q | p Ii i , , then the maximum amount of commodity i that consumers 
as an aggregate are willing to consume at ((π,p-i),I) is ξ.
By hypothesis for all (p -i, I) 
L 1 H  and Qi [0, Qi(p -i, I)), Wi(Qi|(p -i, I))  – 
Qiqi(Qi|(p -i, I))  Wi(ξ|(p -i, I))  – ξqi(Qi|(p -i, I)) for all ξ [0, Qi(p -i, I)).
Assuming the required differentiability of Wi(.|(p -i, I)), we get 
∂ ( )
∂
−W Q p Ii i i( | , )
x
 
 qi(Qi|(p -i, I)) if Qi = 0 and 
∂ ( )
∂
−W Q p Ii i i( | , )
x
 = qi(Qi|(p -i, I)) if Qi (0, Qi(p -i, I)). 





q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, as was required to be proved. 
Now suppose that for all (p -i, I) 






q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .
Let (p,I) L H  and Qi [0, Qi(p -i, I)).










−∫ ( )( ) −x x  > Wi(Qi|(p-i, I))  – piQi, since qi(ξ|(p-I,I)) > pi for all 
ξ < Di(p).






q | p I p d
,
[ , ]
( ) −∫ ( )( ) −x x  < Wi(Di(p,I)|(p-i, I))  – piDi(p,I), since qi(ξ|(p-I,I)) < 
pi for all ξ > Di(p). 
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Thus, Wi(Di(p)|(p -i, I))  – piQi  Wi(Qi|(p -i, I))  – piQi for all Qi [0, Qi(p -i, I)).
This proves the proposition. Q.E.D.

















(( , ), )p p + piDi(p,I).
Hence we have the following corollary of Proposition 1:
Corollary of Proposition 1: Given the assumptions above the consumers 
as an aggregate are competitive surplus maximizers in market i, if and only if for 











(( , ), )p p  + piDi(p,I).
For each (p , I) L H  and Q
i
L
i iQ p I
=
−∏ ( ) )
1




i i iW Q p I
=
−∑ ( )( )
1
, ,  denote the maximum that the consumers as an ag-
gregate are willing to pay for the consumption bundle Q at (p , I) and let 







 be the competitive surplus that the consumers derive 
from the consumption bundle Q at (p,I).
The consumers as an aggregate are said to be competitive surplus 
maximizers, if for all (p , I) L   H  and Q
i
L
i iQ p I
=
−∏ ( ) )
1
0, , , W(D(p)|(p , I)) 
  – 
i
L












It is easy to see that the consumers as an aggregate are competitive surplus 
maximizers if and only if they are competitive surplus maximizers in all markets.
Thus, and in view of proposition 1, we have the following theorem. 
Proposition 2: (i) Given the assumptions above the consumers as an ag-
gregate are competitive surplus maximizers, if and only if they are competitive 
surplus maximizers in every market which in turn is true if and only if for all 





q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .
(ii) Given the assumptions above the consumers as an aggregate are competi-
tive surplus maximizers, if and only if they are competitive surplus maximizers in 
every market which in turn is true if and only if for all (p , I) L   H , i {1, …, L}: 











(( , ), )p p + piDi(p,I).
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Given h {1,…,H}, i {1,…,L}, let Dh: L     L denote the demand 
function of consumer h and let Di
h: L      denote the demand function 
of consumer h for commodity i.
Given h {1, …, H}, i {1, …, L} and (p-i , I
h) L 1 , let pi
h (p -i, I
h) > 0 
be the choke price of commodity i for consumer h at (p -i, I
h). Clearly, 












Hence, for all (p-i , I
h) L 1 , Di
h((pi,p-i), I)= 0 for all pi  pi
h(p -i, I
h). Further, 









As before, for all i {1,…,L}, (p -i, I
h) L 1 , let Qi
h(p -i, I
h) {+ } such 
that {Di
h((pi,p-i), I)|pi > 0}= [0, Qi
h(p -i, I)). 
We assume that for all commodities i and pairs (p -i, I
h) L 1  there ex-






h))   called the inverse 
demand function of commodity i for consumer h, such that: 









(ii)  for all (p -i, I





h ] implies  
[qi
h(Qi
h |(p -i, I)) > qi
h(Qi
h|(p -i, I))].
Property (ii) requires that the demand or inverse demand function of con-
sumer h, for each commodity satisfies the Law of Demand.
For each (p -i, I
h) L 1  and Qi
h [0, Qi




the maximum that consumer h is willing to pay for Qi
h units of commodity 
i at (p -i, I
h).
Consumer h is said to be a competitive surplus maximizer in market i, if 
for all (p -i, I
h) L 1  and Qi
h [0, Qi




h))  – Qi
hqi
h (Qi|(p -i, I
h)) 
 Wi(ξ|(p -i, I
h))  – ξqi
h(Qi
h |(p -i, I)) for all ξ [0, Qi (p -i, I)). 
An equivalent definition of this concept is the following. 
Consumer h is said to be a competitive surplus maximizer in market i, if 











h))  – piQi.
By an argument identical to that used for the inverse market demand func-
tion we get the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: Given the assumptions above the consumer h is a competitive 
surplus maximizer in market i, if and only if for all (p -i, I















q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .




Corollary of Proposition 3: Given the assumptions above the consumer h is 


















(( , ), )p p  + piDi
h(p,Ih). 
Since the willingness to pay of the consumers in any market as an aggre-
gate at any allocation is the sum of the individual willingness to pay, it must 








hW D p I p I
= −∑ ( ) ( )1 ( , | , ) .
Further, for all (p , I) L H  and i {1,…,L}, Qi






= −∑ ( )1 ,  
so that Qi [0, Qi









=∑ 1 . 
Proposition 4: (i) Given the assumptions above the consumers as an aggre-
gate are competitive surplus maximizers in market i, if and only each and every 
one of them are individually competitive surplus maximizers in market i(i.e. for 
all h {1,…,H}consumer h is a competitive maximize in market i) which in turn 
is true if and only if for all h {1,…,H}, (p -i, I















q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .
(ii) Given the assumptions above the consumers as an aggregate are com-
petitive surplus maximizers in market i, if and only each and every one of 
them are individually competitive surplus maximizers in market i(i.e. for all 
h {1,…,H}consumer h is a competitive maximizer in market i) which in turn is 

















(( , ), )p p  + pi Di
h(p,Ih). 






= −∏ ( ) )1 0, , , let 
Wh(Qh|(p , Ih)) denote the maximum that consumer h is willing to pay for 
















Consumer h is said to a competitive surplus maximizer if for all (p , Ih) 










=∑ 1 (p,Ih)  





=∑ 1 . 
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Proposition 5: (i) Given the assumptions above consumer h is a competitive 
surplus maximizer, if and only if he is a competitive surplus maximizer in every 
market which in turn is true if and only if for all i {1,…,L}, (p -i, I
h) L 1  












q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, . (p , I) L   H , 
i {1, …, L} and Qi [0, Qi





q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .
(ii) Given the assumptions above the consumer h is a competitive surplus maxi-
mizer, if and only if he is a competitive surplus maximizer in every market which in 


















(( , ), )p p  + piDi
h(p,Ih).
Since for each (p , I) L H :Q
i
L
i iQ p I
=
−∏ ( ) )
1
0, ,  if and only if for all 














 we get 
the following result.
Theorem 1: Given the assumptions above the following statements are 
equivalent.
(i)  The consumers as an aggregate are surplus maximizers.
(ii)  The consumers as an aggregate are surplus maximizers in every market.
(iii)  Every consumer is a surplus maximizer.
(iv)  Every consumer is a surplus maximize in every market.













q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, .


















(( , ), )p p  + piDi
h(p,Ih). 
Compatibility with budget constrained utility maximization (preferably 
for advanced level students): Let us now return to the demand functions that 
we started the appendix off with and assume that they are generated by a single 
budget constrained utility maximizing consumer. The utility function U: L 1  
is defined on a consumption set of (L+1) dimensional vectors whose last coor-
dinate is money (saved for other purposes or tomorrow). 
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We assume that the utility function is continuous, strictly increasing and for 





j jp Q=∑ 1  + M  I,
(Q,M) L 1
The price of money is held fixed at one, i.e. money is the numeraire good 
and the quantity of money demanded at any (p,I) L   denoted M(p,I) = 
I – i
L
i ip D p I=∑ ( )1 , .
Suppose that in addition to what we have already assumed for U, we as-
sume that U is twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave on 














0  for all i {1, …, L} and (Q,M) L 1. 































, where <(Q(n), M(n))|n > is any sequence in 
L 1, with lim , ( )
n
n nQ M Q,M
→∞
( ) ( )( ) = . 
In addition, we make the following Demand-Utility Compatibility (DUC) 
assumption:
For all (p,I) L    and i L, 
∂ ( ) ( )( )
∂
>
U D p I M p I
Qi
, , ,
0  and 
∂ ( ) ( )( )
∂
>
U D p I M p I
M
, , ,
0 , i.e. all first partial derivatives of U at chosen points 
are strictly positive.
Theorem 2: For a budget constrained utility maximizing consumer, for all 
(p -i, I)





q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, . Hence 
the consumer is a surplus maximizer.
Proof: From the definition of the inverse demand function of a budget con-
strained utility maximizing consumer, it follows that for ξ  Qi, if  p x= ( )( )−q | p Ii i , , 
then the maximum amount of commodity i that the consumer is willing to con-
sume at ((π,p-i),I) is ξ. 
It is well known that given (p,I) L    and i L, the marginal rate of 
substitution between commodity i and money at (D(p,I), M(p,I)) is equal to pi. 
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Hence p
U D p I M p I
Q




∂ ( ) ( )( )
∂





Given commodity i pair (p -i, I)
L 1 , let qi(.|(p-I,I): [0, Qi (p -i, I))  
be the inverse demand function at (p-i,I)
Thus, qi(Qi|(p -i, I)) = 
∂ ( )( ) ( )( )
∂
∂
− − − −U D q Q p I p I M q Q p I p I
Q
U D
i i i i i i i i
i
( ( | , , , )), ( | , , , ))
( ( | , , , )), ( | , , , ))q Q p I p I M q Q p I p I
M
i i i i i i i i− − − −( )( ) ( )( )
∂
 
for all Qi [0, Qi (p -i, I)).
Thus, for each (p -i, I)
L 1  and Qi [0, Qi (p -i, I)): qi(Qi|(p -i, I)) is the rate 
(or ‘speed’) at which the consumer is willing to pay money for Qi units of good 
i given (p -i, I)
L 1 .
Thus for all (p -i, I)





q | p I d∫ −( )( )x x, . 
Hence the consumer is a surplus maximizer. Q.E.D. 
